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TORTS - JOINT TORTFEASORS - ACCORD AND SATISFAC-
TION EXECUTED BY ONE JOINT TORTFEASOR CONSTI-
TUTES A RELEASE OF THAT DEFENDANT FROM FURTHER
LIABILITY BUT NOT A BAR TO THE PLAINTIFF'S SUIT
AGAINST THE UNRELEASED JOINT TORTFEASOR NOR TO
THE UNRELEASED JOINT TORTFEASOR'S INDEMNITY
CLAIM AGAINST THE RELEASED TORTFEASOR. Loh v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 47 Md. App. 110, 422 A.2d 16 (1980).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Loh v. Safeway Stores, Inc., I the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland held that an accord and satisfaction executed by one joint
tortfeasor acted as a release of that defendant from all liability to the
injured plaintiff.2 Under Maryland law, a release of one joint tortfeasor
does not prohibit a plaintiff from proceeding against other unreleased
tortfeasors.3 In dictum, however, the Loh court indicated that the
plaintiff could not recover additional compensation beyond the amount
previously tendered in the accord and satisfaction if the remaining, un-
released tortfeasor was entitled to indemnification from the released
tortfeasor.4 The Loh court reasoned that forcing the released tortfeasor
to pay additional compensation would render the previously executed
accord and satisfaction meaningless.5
This casenote examines the Loh decision and its ramifications on
the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.6 It concludes by
advocating that Maryland adopt the doctrine of partial
indemnification.7
1. 47 Md. App. 110, 422 A.2d 16 (1980).
2. Id at 127-29, 422 A.2d at 26-27.
3. MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, § 19 (1979). Section 19 is part of the Uniform Contribu-
tion Among Tortfeasors Act, codified at MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, §§ 16-24 (1979).
Section 19 provides:
A release by the injured person of one joint tort-feasor, whether before
or after judgment, does not discharge the other tort-feasors unless the
release so provides; but reduces the claim against the other tort-feasors
in the amount of the consideration paid for the release, or in any amount
or proportion by which the release provides that the total claim shall be
reduced, if greater than the consideration paid.
Id
4. 47 Md. App. 110, 130, 422 A.2d 16, 27-28 (1980).
5. Id at 130, 422 A.2d at 28. The Loh court also held that the plaintiff's suit for
breach of implied warranty was sufficiently similar to a "claim in tort" to allow
the plaintiff to claim the role of an injured person for purposes of the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. ld at 121, 422 A.2d at 23. This note does
not address that aspect of the case.
6. MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, §§ 16-24 (1979).
7. Partial indemnification is a method of apportioning liability among joint
tortfeasors when one joint tortfeasor seeks indemnity from another joint
tortfeasor. Partial indemnification requires that each responsible joint tortfeasor
be liable to the plaintiff in proportion to the tortfeasor's relative responsibility in
causing the plaintiffs injury. Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 148-49, 282
N.E.2d 288, 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 387 (1972). See notes 63-66 and accompany-
ing text infra for a further examination of the Dole decision.
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II. BACKGROUND
An accord and satisfaction is a,, method of discharging a disputed
cause of action whereby the parties substitute an agreement in settle-
ment of the claim and execute such substituted agreement.' The "ac-
cord" is the agreement and the "satisfaction" is the execution or
performance of the accord.9 Acceptance of an accord tendered in full
payment of a disputed claim discharges the entire claim.'"
Early Maryland case law held that acceptance of an accord and
satisfaction tendered by one of a number of joint tortfeasors discharged
the plaintiffs claim against all tortfeasors. 1" Maryland reasoned that
the result of the accepted accord and satisfaction was a satisfaction of
the plaintiffs entire claim.12
Other jurisdictions were in accord with Maryland concerning the
effect of accepting an accord and satisfaction tendered by one joint
tortfeasor, but utilized a different reasoning to reach this conclusion.
1 3
These jurisdictions held that an accord and satisfaction constituted a
release of the settling defendant rather than a satisfaction.' 4 A release,
whether gratuitous or for consideration, occurs when a plaintiff agrees
8. 1 M.L.E. Accord and Satisfaction § 1, at 36 (1960); see Porter v. Berwyn Fuel &
Feed Co., 244 Md. 629, 637, 244 A.2d 662, 666 (1966) (citing Franklin Fire Ins.
Co. v. Hamill, 5 Md. 170, 186 (1853)).
9. In re Trexler Co. of America, 15 Del. Ch. 76, 132 A. 144 (1925); 1 M.L.E. Accord
and Satisfaction § 1, at 36 (1960).
10. Hodgson v. Phippin, 159 Md. 97, 99-100, 150 A. 118, 119 (1930). An accord and
satisfaction requires that the debt be unliquidated. If no amount is in dispute,
there can be no accord and satisfaction because the creditor would not receive any
consideration he is not already legally entitled to receive in return for his promise
to discharge the original claim. Eastover Co. v. All Metal Fabricators, Inc., 221
Md. 428, 433-34, 158 A.2d 89, 92 (1960); Foakes v. Beer, 9 App. Cas. 605, 617
(1884); Pinnel's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 237, 237 (C.P. 1602). For a complete examina-
tion of the law concerning accord and satisfaction, see 6 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON
CONTRACTS §§ 1276-1292 (1962).
11. Stockton v. Frey, 4 Gill 406, 423-24 (Md. 1846). At early common law, joint
tortfeasors were defined as two or more persons acting in concert to commit an
intentional wrong. Jackson, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 17 TEX. L. REV.
399, 403 (1939); Reath, Contribution Between Persons Jointly Chargedfor Negli-
gence-Merryweather v. Nixan, 12 HARV. L. REV. 176, 178 (1898); see Sir John
Heydon's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1150 (1613).
12. Trieschman v. Eaton, 224 Md. 111, 116, 166 A.2d 892, 895 (1961) (citing Stockton
v. Frey, 4 Gill 406, 412-13 (Md. 1846)). Since a satisfaction is, by definition, ac-
ceptance of full compensation for a claim, Seither v. Philadelphia Traction Co.,
125 Pa. 397, 402, 17 A. 338, 338 (1889), a plaintiff is limited to a single satisfaction
even if the injury were caused by tortfeasors not acting in concert. See Bell v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 265 Md. 727, 291 A.2d 478 (1972); Lanasa v. Beggs, 159 Md. 311,
151 A. 21 (1930). The exception being if the injuries are separate and distinct, the
plaintiff is entitled to full satisfaction as to each injury. Kyte v. McMillion, 256
Md. 85, 99, 259 A.2d 532, 539 (1969); Huff v. Harbaugh, 49 Md. App. 661, 671,
435 A.2d 108, 114, cert. denied, 292 Md. 135 (1981).
13. E.g., Ransom v. Farish, 4 Cal. 386, 386 (1854); Ruble v. Turner, 12 Va. (2 Hen. &
M.) 38, 44 (1808).
14. Ransom v. Farish, 4 Cal. 386, 386 (1854); Ruble v. Turner, 12 Va. (2 Hen. & M.)
38, 44 (1808).
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to relinquish a claim against a defendant. 5 At common law there was
but one cause of action in a joint tort; 6 therefore, a release to one of
several tortfeasors released all the wrongdoers. 7 The rationale for this
rule was that permitting the plaintiff to sue more than one tortfeasor
would allegedly allow him more than full compensation for his
injury.
1 8
The preclusion of further recovery upon the release of one
tortfeasor was severely criticized. 9 As a result of this criticism, every
American jurisdiction either judicially or statutorily changed the com-
mon law rule to permit a plaintiff to release one joint tortfeasor without
releasing all others.21 Maryland has altered the common law rule con-
cerning the release of tortfeasors by adopting the Uniform Contribu-
15. Melo v. National Fuse & Powder Co., 267 F. Supp. 611, 612 (D. Colo. 1967);
Witcomb v. National Exch. Bank, 123 Md. 612, 616, 91 A. 689, 690 (1914).
16. Sir John Heydon's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1150, 1151-52 (1613).
17. The Mayor of Salford v. Lever, [1891] 1 Q.B. 168, 177; Cocke v. Jenner, 80 Eng.
Rep. 214, 215 (K.B. 1614). Early American courts held that a release to one of
several tortfeasors released all regardless of whether the tortfeasors were acting
jointly or merely concurrently. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 49, at 301-02 (4th ed. 1971).
18. E.g., Lovejoy v. Murray, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 1 (1865); Gunther v. Lee, 45 Md. 60
(1876). But see W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 49, at 302 (4th
ed. 1971) (explaining that suing more than one would not result in excessive com-
pensation because the amount paid for the release must be credited to any judg-
ment obtained against an unreleased tortfeasor); accord, MD. ANN. CODE art. 50,
§ 19 (1979).
19. E.g., Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CAL. L. REV. 413, 425 (1937);
Wigmore, Release to One Joint-Tortfeasor, 17 ILL. L. REV. 563, 563-64 (1923).
The rule was criticized because it discouraged settlement, Black v. Martin, 88
Mont. 256, 267, 292 P. 577, 580 (1930), disregarded the intent of the parties, Dwy
v. Connecticut Co., 89 Conn. 74, 96, 92 A. 883, 890 (1915), constituted a trap for
laypersons ignorant of the law, W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 49, at 304 (4th ed. 1971), and was "anomalous in legal theory" because it dis-
charged non-contributing wrongdoers, thus giving them "an advantage wholly in-
consistent with the nature of their liability." McKenna v. Austin, 134 F.2d 659,
662 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
20. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 49, at 302-03 (4th ed. 1971).
Prosser writes that Washington and Virginia are the only states which still make it
impossible to release one tortfeasor without releasing all. Id Recent legislation
in Virginia, however, enables a plaintiff to release one tortfeasor without releasing
all. VA. CODE § 8.01-35.1 (Supp. 1981). Furthermore, Washington also allows a
plaintiff to release one tortfeasor without releasing all provided the tortfeasors
were not acting in concert. Compare Christianson v. Fayette R. Plumb, Inc., 7
Wash. App. 309, 499 P.2d 72 (1972) (the release of one joint tortfeasor will not
release the remaining tortfeasors if they did not act in concert) with Callan v.
O'Neil, 20 Wash. App. 32, 578 P.2d 890 (1978) (the release of one joint tortfeasor
will release all tortfeasors if they acted in concert).
Jurisdictions changing the rule concerning the release of tortfeasors through
case law sometimes do so by allowing the releasor to reserve his rights against
others, e.g., Fieser v. St. Francis Hosp. & School of Nursing, Inc., 212 Kan. 35,
5 10 P.2d 145 (1973), or, more commonly, by deeming a release a convenant not to
sue. E.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Raish, 205 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1953); Johnson v.
Harnisch, 259 Iowa 1090, 147 N.W.2d 11 (1966). The effect of the covenant not to
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tion Among Tortfeasors Act (UCATA).2 1 The UCATA provides that
an injured party may release one joint tortfeasor without discharging
other joint tortfeasors from liability.22 The effect of the release is to
reduce any judgment against the unreleased joint tortfeasors by the
amount of consideration paid for the release or by the amount agreed
upon in the release if that amount is greater than the consideration
paid.23
In construing the UCATA, however, Maryland has held that a
plaintif's claim is discharged when liability has been adjudged against
one of several joint tortfeasors and the judgment fully paid.24 If the
sue is to continue the cause of action against anyone not a party to the agreement.
Pellett v. Sonotone Corp., 26 Cal. 2d 705, 711, 160 P.2d 783, 787 (1945).
Of the jurisdictions changing the rule through statute, five have enacted indi-
vidual covenant not to sue or release laws which lessen the effect of the common
law rule: California, CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877 (West 1980); Michigan, MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2925(d) (Supp. 1981-1982); Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 537.060 (Vernon 1953); Virginia, VA. CODE § 8.01-35.1 (Supp. 1981); and West
Virginia, W. VA. CODE § 55-7-12 (1981). Six states have adopted the Model Joint
Obligations Act which enables a plaintiff to release one joint tortfeasor while re-
serving the right to sue other joint tortfeasors: Hawaii, HAWAII REV. STAT.
§§ 483-1 to -6 (1976); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 11-17 (1980); Ne-
vada, NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 101.010 -.090 (1979); New York, N.Y. GEN. OBLIG.
LAW §§ 15-101 to -109 (McKinney 1978); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 15-4-1 to -7
(1953); and Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 113.01 -. 11 (West 1974 & Supp. 1981-
1982).
21. MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, §§ 16-24 (1979). Maryland adopted the Act in 1941. Act
of June 1, 1941, ch. 344, §§ 21-29, 1941 Md. Laws 548 (codified at MD. ANN.
CODE art. 50, §§ 16-24 (1979)). Maryland and eight other jurisdictions have
adopted the 1939 version of the UCATA or statutes based thereon. The 1939
version is reprinted at 12 U.L.A. 57-59 (1975). For a list of these nine jurisdic-
tions, see Comment, The Covenant Not to Sue. Virginia's Effort to Bury the Com-
mon Law Rule Regarding the Release of Joint Tortfeasors, 14 U. RICH. L. REV.
809, 814 n.24 (1980). Eleven jurisdictions have adopted the 1955 version of the
UCATA or statutes based thereon. The 1955 version is reprinted at 12 U.L.A. 63-
107 (1975). For a list of these eleven jurisdictions, see Comment, The Covenant
Not to Sue.- Virginia's Effort to Bury the Common Law Rule Regarding the Release
of Joint Tortfeasors, 14 U. RICH. L. REV. 809, 815 n.28 (1980). Future references
to the UCATA throughout this note will be to the 1939 version of that Act.
22. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 4, 12 U.L.A. 57-58 (1975),
codified in Maryland at MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, § 19 (1979). A general release by
a plaintiff to all mankind, however, will operate to discharge all parties to the
claim, Stefan v. Chrysler Corp., 472 F. Supp. 262 (D. Md. 1979); Peters v. Butler,
253 Md. 7, 251 A.2d 600 (1969); Pemrock, Inc. v. Essco Co., 252 Md. 374, 249
A.2d 711 (1969), unless the defendants are liable for distinct and separate injuries.
Kyte v. McMillion, 256 Md. 85, 259 A.2d 532 (1969).
23. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 4, 12 U.L.A. 57-58 (1975),
codified in Maryland at MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, § 19 (1979). The UCATA also
expanded the definition of joint tortfeasor to include "two or more persons jointly
or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property." Id § 16(a)
(emphasis added). Therefore, the UCATA encompasses concurrent or successive
tortfeasors as well as joint tortfeasors. Trieschman v. Eaton, 224 Md. 111, 115,
166 A.2d 892, 894 (1961).
24. See Grantham v. Board of County Comm'rs, 251 Md. 28, 37, 246 A.2d 548, 553
(1968). Examples of a fully satisfied judgment are a settlement agreement paid in
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judgment is not fully satisfied, the plaintiff is free to pursue his claim
against other joint tortfeasors.25
The UCATA also addresses the right of indemnity between joint
tortfeasors.26 Indemnity requires that the defendant primarily responsi-
ble for the plaintiff's loss bear the entire burden of the plaintiff's com-
pensation. The UCATA specifically provides that no right to
indemnity under existing law shall be impaired.2 Generally, in Mary-
land, tortfeasors acting in concert or equally at fault are not entitled to
indemnity.29 However, when. the wrongful act of one tortfeasor results
in a judgment against another, the latter may be indemnified. °
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF LOH
Mrs. Loh purchased a package of beef frankfurters which were
full after an adverse judgment at trial but before a new trial commences, id, and a
consent judgment. Bell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 265 Md. 727, 291 A.2d 478 (1972).
25. Trieschman v. Eaton, 224 Md. 111, 166 A.2d 892 (1961). In Trieschman, the court
explained that an unpaid or partially paid judgment does not preclude further
suit. Id at 119, 166 A.2d at 896. Furthermore, an order of satisfaction entered by
an auditor and master prior to trial does not bar further litigation. Maryland
Lumber Co. v. White, 205 Md. 180, 200, 107 A.2d 73, 81 (1954).
26. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT § 6, 12 U.L.A. 58 (1975), codi-
fied in Maryland at MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, § 21 (1979).
27. Park Circle Motor Co. v. Willis, 201 Md. 109, 113, 94 A.2d 443, 446 (1953); Mc-
Fall v. Compagnie Maritime Belge, 304 N.Y. 314, 328, 107 N.E.2d 463, 471
(1952).
28. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT § 6, 12 U.L.A. 58 (1975), codi-
fied in Maryland at MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, § 21 (1979).
29. Baltimore & O.RR. v. County Comm'rs, 113 Md. 404, 414, 77 A. 930, 933 (1910);
12 M.L.E. Indemnity § 6, at 164-65 (1961).
30. Blockston v. United States, 278 F. Supp. 576, 584 (D. Md. 1968) (citing Baltimore
& O.R.R. v. County Comm'rs, 113 Md. 404, 414, 77 A. 930, 933 (1910)). Most
indemnity cases involve joint tortfeasors who had some sort of relationship prior
to the tort which justifies the claim for indemnity. Examples of this prior relation-
ship include a party seeking indemnification after being held responsible solely by
operation of law, as when an employer is held liable for the torts of his employee,
Pennsylvania Treshermen & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
233 Md. 205, 215, 196 A.2d 76, 81 (1963), or an employer is held liable for the
torts of an independent contractor. Orient Overseas Line v. Globemaster Balti-
more, Inc., 33 Md. App. 372, 394, 365 A.2d 325, 341 (1976), cert. denied, 279 Md.
684 (1977). The prior relationship may also exist when the indemnitee has in-
curred liability because of a breach of duty owed to him by the supplier of goods,
Gardenvillage Realty Corp. v. Russo, 34 Md. App. 25, 40, 366 A.2d 101, 111
(1976), or may be the result of a contract providing for indemnification which was
executed between the joint tortfeasors prior to the tort. Crockett v. Crothers, 264
Md. 222, 227-28, 285 A.2d 612, 615 (1972).
If a prior relationship exists, Maryland employs an active-passive analysis in
determining whether to grant indemnity. Gardenvillage Realty Corp. v. Russo, 34
Md. App. 25, 40, 366 A.2d 101, 111 (1976). This means that as between an active
tortfeasor and a tortfeasor whose liability is merely passive, the active wrongdoer
should be responsible for compensating the plaintiff's entire loss. Id In Park
Circle Motor Co. v. Willis, 201 Md. 109, 113, 94 A.2d 443, 446 (1953), the court
indicated in dictum that a similar analysis, i.e., comparing primary versus secon-
dary liability, may also be utilized in deciding whether to grant indemnity. Id
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produced by Garden State Kosher Provisions (Garden State) and dis-
tributed to a Safeway store.3' While biting one of the franks, Mrs. Loh
broke a tooth on a foreign substance in the frank.32 Garden State's
insurance carrier was notified, and the insurer tendered a $1,000 check
to Mrs. Loh's attorney as "full payment of Mrs. Loh's claim. ' 33 Her
counsel deposited the check on her behalf but notified the insurer that
the check would not constitute full settlement for his client's injuries.
34
Mrs. Loh filed suit against Safeway for breach of implied war-
ranty.35 Safeway then filed a third party claim against Garden State
demanding indemnification. 36 Both defendants moved for summary
judgment.37 The trial court granted both motions, reasoning that ac-
ceptance of the check was an accord and satisfaction which represented
full satisfaction of Mrs. Loh's claim.a Mrs. Loh appealed to the Court
of Special Appeals of Maryland.
IV. THE COURT'S HOLDING
The court of special appeals held that Mrs. Loh's deposit of Gar-
den State's check was an accord and satisfaction.3 ' The Loh court then
faced the issue of whether the settlement with Garden State constituted
a full satisfaction of Mrs. Loh's claim, thereby barring further suit, or
merely a release of Garden State, thereby enabling Mrs. Loh to pro-
31. Loh v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 47 Md. App. 110, 112, 422 A.2d 16, 18 (1980).
32. Id
33. Id
34. Id at 112-13, 422 A.2d at 18. In his letter to Garden State, Mrs. Loh's attorney
stated, "[Wie must advise you that we do not consider the $1,000 payment to be in
full settlement of Mrs. Loh's claim." Id at 112, 422 A.2d at 18.
35. Id at 113, 422 A.2d at 18. Mrs. Loh's suit alleged both breach of warranties of
merchantability, MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 2-314 (1975), and fitness for a par-
ticular purpose, id § 2-315. 47 Md. App. 110, 113, 422 A.2d 16, 18 (1980).
36. 47 Md. App. 110, 113, 422 A.2d 16, 19 (1980). Safeway's third party claim was
stated in two counts. First, Safeway demanded indemnification from Garden
State because the product was manufactured by Garden State and impliedly fit for
consumption. Second, Safeway alleged it was the negligence of Garden State
which caused the injury. Id
37. Id at 114, 422 A.2d at 19. Garden State's motion for summary judgment argued
that acceptance of the $1,000 check represented a full accord and satisfaction to
any liability Garden State owed Mrs. Loh. Safeway's motion asserted that Mrs.
Loh "is entitled to but one satisfaction of her claim and cannot after collecting
money in settlement of a claim against one person allegedly responsible then, with
impunity, proceed by Court action against another." Id Mrs. Loh opposed the
summary judgment motions on the grounds that under art. 50, § 19 of the Mary-
land Annotated Code, a release of one joint tortfeasor does not release all. Id at
116, 422 A.2d at 20.
38. Id at 114-15, 422 A.2d at 19. The trial judge indicated that allowing Mrs. Loh to
proceed against Safeway might result in double recovery. Id Double recovery
would not have resulted from suit against Safeway, however, because any judg-
ment against Safeway would have been reduced by the amount of consideration
paid by Garden State for the release. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, § 19 (1979).
39. 47 Md. App. 110, 116, 422 A.2d 16, 20 (1980).
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ceed against the unreleased tortfeasor, Safeway.' Prior to Loh, no
Maryland appellate court had considered the effect of an accord and
satisfaction under the UCATA.4 '
In light of prior Maryland cases concerning joint tortfeasors and
the difference between a release and a satisfaction,42 the Loh court rea-
soned that the accord and satisfaction more closely resembled a release
of Garden State, rather than a satisfaction of Mrs. Loh's claim, because
there had been no determination of fault on the part of any wrong-
doer. 3 Since the accord and satisfaction represented only a release,
Safeway was not entitled to summary judgment." Furthermore, while
the release of Garden State absolved that defendant from further liabil-
ity,45 the Loh court held that Garden State was not entitled to summary
judgment because its fault had to be determined for purposes of the
indemnity claim Safeway had filed.'
In dictum, the Loh court indicated that Mrs. Loh could receive
only the amount previously tendered by Garden State if Safeway was
entitled to indemnity.47 The Loh court reasoned that allowing Mrs.
Loh to obtain additional compensation would deprive Garden State of
the accord and satisfaction executed earlier."8
V. EVALUATION
After the court of special appeals rendered its opinion, the case
was continued in the trial court. The trial court granted Safeway's in-
demnity claim against Garden State.4 9 Therefore, Mrs. Loh's deposit
of Garden State's check in effect resulted in a release of both Garden
40. Id at 126, 422 A.2d at 25.
41. This author's research has found no reported opinion to date from any jurisdic-
tion considering the effect of an accord and satisfaction under the UCATA.
42. The court of special appeals seemed most influenced by Grantham v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 251 Md. 28, 246 A.2d 548 (1968). The Grantham court held
that a settlement agreement fully paid by one joint tortfeasor after that defendant
received an adverse judgment at trial but prior to a new trial represented full
satisfaction of the plaintiff's claim. Id at 38-39, 246 A.2d at 553-54. The court in
Grantham, however, was careful to distinguish its facts from an earlier Maryland
case which held that an order of satisfaction entered against one joint tortfeasor
prior to any judgment was merely a release of that wrongdoer. Id at 38-39, 246
A.2d at 554 (discussing Maryland Lumber Co. v. White, 205 Md. 180, 107 A.2d 73
(1954)). The Grantham court's care in differentiating itself from a pre-judgment
satisfaction indicated to the Loh court that the crucial point in distinguishing a
full satisfaction from a release was the rendering and full payment of a judgment.
Loh v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 47 Md. App. 110, 127, 422 A.2d 16, 26 (1980).
43. 47 Md. App. 110, 127, 422 A.2d 16, 26 (1980).
44. Id
45. Id at 129, 422 A.2d at 27.
46. Id at 128, 422 A.2d at 27.
47. Id at 130, 422 A.2d at 27-28.
48. Id at 130, 422 A.2d at 28.




State and Safeway.50 However, the release of one joint tortfeasor effec-
tuating the release of all is one of the results the UCATA is designed to
avoid.5
The dictum in Loh abrogates one of the reasons for adopting the
UCATA, i e., the desire to encourage settlement.
52 Due to Loh, Mary-
land discourages a plaintiff from settling with a joint tortfeasor who
might have to indemnify the remaining tortfeasors because such a set-
tlement would deny the plaintiff any additional compensation.
53 A
plaintiff in a Loh situation now faces the same choice an injured party
did at common law. He must either accept the tender and relinquish
his entire claim without full remuneration or reject the tender
54 and
proceed to trial.
The problem illustrated by Loh is one in which a result fair to all
parties cannot be achieved under current Maryland law. This is due to
the two ways joint tortfeasors may apportion a judgment among them-
selves: pro rata contribution 55 or indemnity.
56 Since Safeway was enti-
50. Maryland follows the traditional common law doctrine that a protest does not
prevent an accord from being satisfied. Hodgson v. Phippin, 159 Md. 97, 99-100,
150 A. 118, 119 (1930) (citing Scheffenacker v. Hoopes, 113 Md. 111, 117, 77 A.
130, 133 (1910)). Some courts have held, however, that the common law rule has
been changed by section 1-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code and a protest
will preserve the plaintiff's rights against the tendering party. Eg., Kroulee Corp.
v. A. Klein & Co., 103 Misc. 2d 441,426 N.Y.S.2d 206 (1980); Scholl v. Tallnan,
247 N.W.2d 490 (S.D. 1976) (dictum). Maryland has not interpreted the effect of
section 1-207.
Counsel for Mrs. Loh informed Garden State the check did not represent full
settlement of her claim. Therefore, it would appear counsel could have argued
that his protest preserved Mrs. Loh's right to pursue an action against Garden
State under section 1-207 of the Uniform Commercial Code. For an examination
of most of the cases and articles interpreting section 1-207 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, see Chancellor, Inc. v. Hamilton Applicance Co., 175 N.J. Super.
345, 418 A.2d 1326 (1980).
51. UNIF. CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 4, 12 U.L.A. 57-58 (1975),
codified in Maryland at MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, § 19 (1979).
52. Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co., 41 Md. App. 579, 620, 398 A.2d 490, 513
(1979), rev'don other grounds sub nom. General Motors Corp. v. Lahocki, 286 Md.
714, 410 A.2d 1039 (1980).
53. Throughout this evaluation, it is assumed that the amount of the settlement is less
than the full value of the plaintiffs claim. If the settlement figure fully compen-
sates the plaintiff for his injuries, settlement prior to trial is not discouraged and
there would be nothing unfair about denying the plaintiff additional compensa-
tion from unreleased tortfeasors.
54. The plaintiff should clearly reject the tender because some jurisdictions have held
that merely keeping the check for an unreasonable period of time without cashing
it is the equivalent of acceptance of the accord and satisfaction. Annot., 13
A.L.R.2d 736 (1950) and cases collected therein. Maryland has not addressed this
issue.
55. MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, § 17 (1979). This statute provides for a right to pro rata
contribution among joint tortfeasors. Id While "pro rata" is not defined by stat-
ute, it has been described as meaning "that the burden is distributed among joint
tortfeasors in numerical shares. . . based on actual number of tortfeasors, ...
for example, 50% each as to two, or 33 1/3% each as to three tortfeasors." Allen,
Joint Tortfeasors. Contribution, Indemnity and Procedure, The Daily Rec. (Balti-
[Vol. II
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tied to indemnity, Mrs. Loh could not collect any additional payment
even if she had obtained a judgment against Safeway." On the other
hand, if Safeway were denied indemnity, it could seek contribution
from Garden State to reduce its liability to Mrs. Loh.5" If the claim for
contribution were granted, Garden State would not be forced to pay
any additional compensation,59 but Safeway would be liable for only
one half the total amount of the judgment.60 Paying one half the judg-
ment, however, represents a percentage of liability greater than
Safeway's actual degree of fault in causing the injury.6' Therefore, the
unfairness results from the alternatives of denying the plaintiff an op-
portunity for full compensation of her injury or imposing liability on
Safeway beyond its fault.62
The inequities of the Loh decision could be ameliorated by adopt-
ing a theory of partial indemnification as New York did in Dole v. Dow
Chemical Co. 63 In Dole, the plaintiff brought an action against one
more), June 7, 1948, at 4, col. 1; accord, Swigert v. Welk, 213 Md. 613, 619, 133
A.2d 428, 431 (1957); c.i Lahocki v. Contee Sand & Gravel Co., 41 Md. App. 579,
621, 398 A.2d 490, 514 (1979) (criticizing but, nevertheless, upholding this defini-
tion of pro rata), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. General Motors Corp. v.
Lahocki, 286 Md. 714, 410 A.2d 1039 (1980).
56. MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, § 21 (1979). For an examination of the law concerning
indemnity, see notes 26-30 and accompanying text supra.
57. 47 Md. App. 110, 130, 422 A.2d 16, 27-28 (1980).
58. MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, § 20 (1979). Under section 20, the release of Garden
State would not prevent Safeway from pursuing a claim for contribution. Al-
though Safeway's original third party claim sought only indemnity, 47 Md. App.
110, 130 n.25, 422 A.2d 16, 27 n.25 (1980), if that request were denied, Safeway
could amend its plea to seek contribution. See MD. R.P. 320(c).
59. Loh v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 47 Md. App. 110, 129, 422 A.2d 16, 27 (1980). The
acceptance of the accord and satisfaction allowed Garden State to rest assured its
liability would not exceed $1,000. Id Accord, Swigert v. Welk, 213 Md. 613, 619,
133 A.2d 428, 431 (1957).
60. For an example of how a judgment would be apportioned through contribution in
aLoh situation, see Swigert v. Welk, 213 Md. 613, 619, 133 A.2d 428, 431 (1957).
61. See note 67 infra (discussing Safeway's liability in causing Mrs. Loh's injury).
Some observers may feel that the contribution alternative is also unfair to a plain-
tiff like Mrs. Loh. It is true that if a judgment were obtained against Safeway for
an amount in excess of $2,000, Mrs. Loh would be denied the full amount of that
judgment because Safeway would only have to pay one half the amount, see Swi-
gert v. Welk, 213 Md. 613, 619, 133 A.2d 428, 431 (1957), and Garden State would
not be liable for anything beyond the previously tendered $1,000. Loh v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 47 Md. App. 110, 129, 422 A.2d 16, 27 (1980); accord, Swigert v.
Welk, 213 Md. 613, 619, 133 A.2d 428, 431 (1957). Forcing Garden State to pay
any additional compensation, however, denies that defendant the benefit of its
accord and satisfaction. Loh v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 47 Md. App. 110, 129, 422
A.2d 16, 27 (1980).
62. Another possibility is having the court reduce any judgment against Safeway by
the amount of consideration paid for the release. MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, § 19
(1979); see Brooks v. Daley, 242 Md. 185, 218 A.2d 184 (1966). This alternative
would also result in liability beyond Safeway's actual degree of fault. See note 67
infra (discussing Safeway's liability in causing Mrs. Loh's injury).
63. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
504 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 11
joint tortfeasor. 4 That defendant filed a third party claim for indem-
nity against another joint tortfeasor. The court held that each responsi-
ble party should be liable to the plaintiff in proportion to his relative
responsibility in causing the injury.6 5 Therefore, the Dole court created
an alternative, in appropriate cases, to full indemnification. That alter-
native was partial indemnification, which provides that each tortfeasor
remunerate the plaintiff in accordance with that tortfeasor's actual
fault. 66
If Maryland were to adopt the doctrine of partial indemnification,
most of the legal anomalies Loh illustrated would be alleviated.67 A
plaintiff would no longer be discouraged from settling with one
tortfeasor prior to trial because the plaintiff could still recover whatever
portion of his injury is attributable to the unreleased tortfeasors. 68 Nor
would the result be that of either denying a plaintiff adequate compen-
64. Id at 145, 282 N.E.2d at 290, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 385. In Dole, the plaintiffs dece-
dent was killed by exposure to a poisonous chemical while working for his em-
ployer, Urban. Id at 146, 282 N.E.2d at 290, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 385. The
administratrix brought suit against the manufacturer of the poison, Dow Chemi-
cal Co., for not providing the decedent with a personal warning. Dow filed a third
party claim for indemnity against Urban, alleging Urban was primarily negligent
m failing to comply with Dow's instructions accompanying the poison. Id
65. Id at 148-49, 282 N.E.2d at 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 387. Significantly, while Dole
involved a claim in negligence, the doctrine of partial indemnification has been
extended to claims for breach of warranty of fitness for a particular purpose,
Coons v. Washington Mirror Works, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 653 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), mod-
&fed, 477 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1973); Noble v. Desco Shoe Corp., 41 A.D. 2d 908, 343
N.Y.S.2d 134 (1973), and implied warranty of merchantability. Walsh v. Ford
Motor Co., 70 Misc. 2d 1031, 335 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1972).
66. An illustration of how the Dole principle operates is provided in Walsh v. Ford
Motor Co., 70 Misc. 2d 1031, 335 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1972). In Walsh, the plaintiff
sued both an automobile dealer and the manufacturer for a defective carburetor.
Id at 1031, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 112. The Walsh court found that while the manufac-
turer was primarily liable, the dealer also had a duty to inspect the defective item.
Id at 1032, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 112. His failure to do so resulted in the dealer's being
25% responsible for the problem and, correspondingly, liable for one fourth of the
judgment. Id at 1033, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 113.
67. Partial indemnification would not have aided Mrs. Loh, however, because her
case is an example in which, to paraphrase Dole, the facts warrant what Safeway
was seeking, ie., a traditional full indemnification. Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30
N.Y.2d 143, 147, 282 N.E.2d 288, 291, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 386 (1972). Safeway was
in no way responsible for the plaintiffs injury and could not even be accused of
negligence since it was not reasonably expected to break open each package of
frankfurters and inspect the contents. See Kratz v. American Stores Co., 359 Pa.
335, 59 A.2d 138 (1948); 2A L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY
§ 18.03[l][a] (1981) and cases collected therein. However, in a situation in which
the plaintiff settles with a joint tortfeasor who is primarily but not totally at fault
in causing the injury, partial indemnification would enable a plaintiff to seek ad-
ditional compensation by pursuin an action a~ainst the unreleased tortfeasors for
an amount equal to their proportion of fault m causing the injury.
68. For an example of how Loh would be resolved under partial indemnification, see
Bartels v. City of Williston, 276 N.W.2d 113 (N.D. 1979). Bartels involved a com-
parative negligence jurisdiction, but the results would be the same for puposes of
distributing liability if North Dakota had adopted only partial indemnification.
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sation for his injuries or forcing a defendant to pay a percentage of the
judgment greater than that defendant's actual degree of fault.
Furthermore, adopting partial indemnification would be no more
foreign to Maryland than it was to New York. Prior to Dole, New
York law allowed only strict pro rata contribution,6 9 determined in-
demnity by an active-passive analysis,7" and refused to adopt compara-
tive negligence.7 Current Maryland law is the same.72 None of these
factors, however, prevented the Dole court from concluding that there
should be an apportionment of responsibility between joint tortfeasors
in relation to their comparative fault.73
VI. CONCLUSION
By indicating in dictum that a plaintiff may not receive additional
compensation if the unreleased joint tortfeasor is entitled to indemnity
from the released tortfeasor, Loh v. Safeway Stores, Inc. 74 results in a
return to the common law rule that a release of one joint tortfeasor
releases all. The effect of the dictum is to abrogate a specific reason for
adopting the UCATA by discouraging plaintiffs from settling with joint
tortfeasors. While this result seems harsh, an examination of Maryland
law reveals no alternative resolution which adjudicates fairly to all par-
ties in a situation like Loh. An adoption of partial indemnification,
however, would ameliorate the problem by enabling a plaintiff to pur-
69. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 1402 (McKinney 1962) (repealed by Act of Sept. 1, 1974,
ch. 742, § 1402, 1974 N.Y. Laws 1153).
70. See Colon v. Board of Educ., 11 N.Y.2d 446, 451, 184 N.E.2d 294, 298, 230
N.Y.S.2d 697, 702 (1962). For an explanation of the active-passive analysis, see
note 30 supra.
71. Condon v. Epstein, 8 Misc. 2d 674, 677, 168 N.Y.S.2d 189, 191 (1957). Had New
York employed comparative negligence at the time of Dole, partial indemnifica-
tion would represent a less radical departure from prior law because, as some
commentators have suggested, partial indemnification (which has been referred to
as comparative contribution) is just a type of comparative negligence. Phillips,
Contribution and Indemnity in Products Liability, 42 TENN. L. REv. 85, 95-97
(1974); accord, American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 583,
578 P.2d 899, 902, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 185 (1978). Currently, New York is a com-
parative negligence jurisdiction, having adopted such a concept in 1975, three
years after the Dole decision. Act of Sept. 1, 1975, ch. 69, § 1411, 1975 N.Y. Laws
94 (codified at N.Y. Civ. P-Ac. LAW § 1411 (McKinney 1976)).
72. MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, § 17(b) (1979) (pro rata contribution); Gardenvillage Re-
alty Corp. v. Russo, 34 Md. App. 25, 40, 366 A.2d 101, 111 (1976) (active-passive
analysis of indemnity). Maryland does not follow a doctrine of comparative negli-
gence, but there were efforts in the 1980 and the 1982 General Assembly to adopt
such a concept. S. 1007, Md. Gen. Assembly, 1982 Sess.; H. 1484, Md. Gen. As-
sembly, 1980 Sess. Neither bill was enacted into law.
73. Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 149, 282 N.E.2d 288, 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d
382, 387 (1972).
74. 47 Md. App. 110, 422 A.2d 16 (1980).
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sue an action against the unreleased joint tortfeasor for that defendant's
proportionate responsibility in causing the injury.
Timothy M. Mulligan
